Animal-humanities and the Eco-sophical Parergon: Homo Reflectus in Species History by Purakayastha,  Anindya Sekhar & Pandit, Saptaparni
Sanglap 3.1 (August 2016) 
Critiquing Humanism 
 
97 
 
Animal-humanities and the Eco-sophical Parergon: Homo Reflectus in Species History  
Anindya Sekhar Purakayastha & Saptaparni Pandit 
 
When I tell you, a cat must have THREE DIFFERENT NAMES… 
Such as Peter, Augustus, Alonzo or James… 
There are fancier names if you think they sound sweeter,  
Some for the gentlemen, some for the dames: 
Such as Plato, Admetus, Electra, Demeter … 
But THE CAT HIMSELF KNOWS, and will never confess… 
His mind is engaged in a rapt contemplation of the thought, 
Of the thought, of the thought of his name: 
His ineffable effable 
Effanineffable  
Deep and inscrutable singular Name. (“Naming of Cats” in Old Possum`s Book of 
Practical Cats, T. S. Eliot) 
 
 
One can even set up quite ridiculous cases. A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, 
along with the following device (which must be secured against direct interference 
by the cat) … there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance…If one has left this entire 
system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives.... (Schrodinger`s 
“Thought Experiment” with the Cat) 
 
It surrounds me. And from the vantage of this being-there-before-me it can allow 
itself to be looked at, no doubt, but also-something that philosophy perhaps forgets, 
perhaps being this calculated forgetting itself-it can look at me. It has its point of 
view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have 
ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the neighbor than 
these moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a cat.  (Derrida, 380) 
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Globalization means the commercialization of the planet Earth in all its forms. 
(Braidotti 7) 
 
 
This predominant (discordant?) feline inflexion in the beginning of this paper may encourage the reader 
to surmise that this is perhaps a philosophisation on the “zoontology” of non-anthropomorphic whiskers 
and the top heavy references to good old T.S.Eliot, noted physicist Erwin Schrodinger and our 
philosopher-saboteur Jacques Derrida on the identical question of the cat is a deliberate attempt on our 
part to dismantle the hegemony of the human so that a “zoography” of morals can be inaugurated in a 
world standing on the brink of Anthropocentric apocalypse caused by our inflated human hubris. It is 
interesting to see Eliot jocularly naming the cat after Plato that does not however erase the cat/Plato 
hierarchy. “Schrodinger’s Cat” has itself become a scientific catch phrase that safely elides however the 
all important question of Schrodinger nonchalantly placing the cat in the radioactive chamber, justifying 
in that way the normal imaginary of caged and dissected animals for human needs. It is Derrida who 
comes to expose the inherent violence in such normative nonchalance when it comes to our atrocities 
against animals or our subjugation of non-humans. Seen through post-Anthropocentric optics, these 
normative taxonomies of human/non-human assume larger significance as we are called upon to think 
through the Earth or through other fellow species to salvage the damage of our “common home”- the 
planet Earth, inhabited equally by humans and non-humans. Human-centric anthropomorphic imaginaries 
are built on power bound binaries of inside/outside, human/non-human and such divisions remind us of 
Derrida`s notion of the “parergon” that problematises the frame/content, or inside/outside binaries to tease 
out a bridge between the divided realms. Ours therefore is a proposed eco-sophical parergonal suturing of 
the human/non-human, the Earth/Earth-others to constitute a holistic frame of co-living. Borrowing Claire 
Colebrook, Tom Cohen and J Hillis Miller’s ideas in their Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols (2016), we 
intend to work for alternative philosophems – something Rosi Braidotti and Cary Wolfe named as anti-
humanism or posthumanism 
Not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we have always been human, or that 
we are only that. Some of us are not even considered fully human now, let alone at previous 
moments of Western social, political and scientific history. Not if by ‘human’ we mean that 
creature familiar to us from the Enlightenment and its legacy: ‘The Cartesian subject of the 
cogito, the Kantian “community of reasonable beings”, or, in more sociological terms, the 
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subject as citizen, rights-holder, property-owner, and so on’ (Wolfe, 2010a). And yet the 
term enjoys widespread consensus and it maintains the re-assuring familiarity of common 
sense. We assert our attachment to the species as if it were a matter of fact, a given. So much 
so that we construct a fundamental notion of Rights around the Human. But is it so?  
(Braidotti 1) 
 
This calls for a serious revaluation of our conceptual and cognitive taxonomies in relation to sub-
humans and non-humans and in that way there is a greater need now to redefine the category of the 
“human.” Braidotti observes that the “debates in mainstream culture range from hard-nosed business 
discussions of robotics, prosthetic technologies, neuroscience and bio-genetic capital to fuzzier new age 
visions of trans-humanism and techno-transcendence” (Braidotti 2) and all these technologized 
buzzwords she felt are doing the rounds to enhance solely the cause of the human at the cost of the non-
humans. Such “colonization of the life [non-human]-world” leads to what Braidotti calls the “post-
human” that seeks a decentering of the “human.” The present excursus would argue for attempts to 
deepen such post-humanist approaches in the humanities and social sciences so that a better critique of 
Anthropocentric humanism can be actualized. We would imagine a holistic approach here incorporating 
the necessity of both western and eastern parallax views in forging an alternative imaginary that questions 
our existing epistemic a priories. Braidotti raises these fundamental questions in her book: 
The main questions I want to address in this book are: firstly, what is the  posthuman?  More 
specifically, what are the intellectual and historical itineraries that may lead us to the 
posthuman? Secondly: where does the posthuman condition leave humanity? More 
specifically, what new forms of subjectivity are supported by the posthuman? Thirdly: how 
does the posthuman engender its own forms of inhumanity? More specifically, how might 
we resist the inhuman(e) aspects of ou r era? And last, how does the posthuman affect the 
practice of the Humanities today?  More specifically, what is the function of theory in 
posthuman times?  (Braidotti, 3) 
 
In similar vein, Cary Wolfe’s What is Posthumanism (2010) begins with drawing our attention to a 
hackneyed definition of Humanism. He refers to Michel Foucault who in his 1984 essay, “What is 
Enlightenment?” leads us to the actuality that humanism is apparently a doctrine in itself, full of its own 
prepossessions and superstitions, which Etienne Balibar calls “Anthropological universals.” Foucault also 
drew a disjunction between Enlightenment and Humanism because Humanism is a doctrine and therefore, 
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Enlightenment, in its true breath, should be a threat to that tenet. At this present juncture of the 
Anthropocene, a constitutional interference has been posited by Wolfe: 
[…] even if we take the additional posthumanist step of rejecting the various 
anthropological, political, and scientific dogmas of the human that Foucault insists are in 
tension with Enlightenment per se, we must take yet another step, another post-, and realize 
that the nature of thought itself must change if it is to be posthumanist.  (Wolfe xvi) 
 
This means that posthumanism in its discursive practices should not just refer to the “thematics of 
decentering” of humans in connection to their existential coordinates but it should also interrogate the 
thematics of “thinking” itself 
Here the spirit of my intervention is akin to Foucault’s in “What Is Enlightenment?”; the 
point is not to reject humanism tout court—indeed, there are many values and aspirations to 
admire in humanism—but rather to show how those aspirations are undercut by the 
philosophical and ethical frameworks used to conceptualize them.  (Wolfe xii) 
 
Such dogma ridden and anthropomorphic philosophical frameworks led to the hierarchic distinctions 
between humans and non-human others and in what follows we would look into an attempt to reverse the 
man/animal taxonomic binary, something that needs to be dismantled to restructure our colonizing 
thought patterns. 
 
Zoographies and Thinking Through Animals 
Matthew Calarco has been consistently (re)writing about animals and the place of animals in human 
thinking in his path-breaking works, such as Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to 
Derrida (2008), The Death of the Animal (2009) and Thinking through Animals: Identity, Difference, 
Indistinction (2015). His neologisms such as “Zoography” and “zoontobiography” are concept metaphors 
that have radical claims to draw our attention in support of non-human others, and in Thinking through 
Animals Calarco classified pro-animal theorists as “Identity theorists,” “Right based theorists” and 
“difference based theorists.” Identity based theorists identify similar features between human and non-
humans, while “right based thinkers” seek to fight for animal rights and difference based theorists 
acknowledge the human/non-human differences and yet call for a respect for the non-humans. This 
human disrespect for the Earth-others stems from epistemic and discursive prejudices and dogmas. 
Aristotle, Calarco reminds us, attributed only humans with the privilege of reason and cognition or what 
Sanglap 3.1 (August 2016) 
Critiquing Humanism 
 
101 
 
he called “Logos” and his denial of Logos to animals generated in Identity based theorists the desire to 
locate reasoning abilities in animals as well and in that way they reinforced their logic identity between 
humans and non-humans. Logocentricism is a reason based notion of identity among humans and animals 
that characterizes human beings as the inheritor of logos or reasoning capacities. Such a reason oriented 
view has however, been challenged by many and Calarco therefore mentions the ‘difference based theory’ 
on our approach to human-animal relations. Identity based theorists use the term “speciesism” to refer to 
the irrational attitude that we demonstrate to exclude animals from our mutually formed ethical 
community without any ground of reason. Specieism is akin to other forms of prejudiced hatred such as 
racism. Our hatred and indifference to non-humans is, therefore, foundational and something to do with 
our self-proclaimed anthropocentrism. There are a whole set of institutions, systems and discursive 
formations that determine our attitude for animals. Identity paradigm posits that similar beings should 
receive similar moral treatments/consideration. The theorists of difference as explained by Calarco rely 
not on any idea of continuity, similarity and identity among human and non-human agents, but they build 
their hypothesis of thinking through animals through an idea of difference or an Ethics of otherness. 
All difference theorists such as Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger did not believe that human nature 
can be characterized by some timeless or unchanging essence. In other words, they do not have any inner 
core of humanity untouched by history. Human beings, Calarco concludes, are irreducibly enmeshed in 
socio-historical and cultural formations. They are “decentred,” dispossessed” and “ex-posed (in the sense 
of being posed outward to the other)”. To borrow Heidegger, we may say that even before we can think of 
ourselves and say something of ourselves, we have already been thrown outside of ourselves to a world 
populated by others. Critique of humanism “refigures the individual as a unique node in a network of 
relations,” an irreplaceable being in becoming – a singular other. We “generally tend to group others into 
recognizable and repeatable categories, thereby neutralizing their singularity and domesticating their 
strangeness” (Calarco, 32) but sometimes humans recognize or encounter a different other, an ethically 
other, someone who is irreducible to his/her usual perception of him/her. This realization throws a 
challenge to our existence and gradually we grow a sense of realization that we unnecessarily harbor 
some violence against them. This ultimately may lead to an urge for transformation in us as we realize the 
inadequacy of our usual mode of existence that fail to do justice to the singularity of the other. This 
transformative desire to respond to the “call of the other” constitutes the core of the ethics of difference. 
An ethics of difference starts from the premise that the ultimate origin of ethics resides not 
with me (my rationality, my freedom, my autonomy) but with the other, with radical 
difference or heteronomy. (Calarco 32) 
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In a genuinely ethical relation, I become a different “I”, an ethical “sub-ject”, someone 
thrown under the Other as support. (Calarco 33) 
 
 
Hence the ideas of anti-humanism, relational ontology of human beings, and the idea of ethics deriving 
from the singular encounter with the Other – constitute the basic starting points for a posthuman future. 
However, the tragedy is almost all the ‘philosophers of difference’ restricted their purviews within the 
anthropomorphic world, for them animals have no world of their own, they are cognitively “poor in 
world” for Heidegger as only humans are open to “meaning” and a world of significance. (Calarco 33) 
Going through Calarco`s present book as well as his early work, Zoographies: The Question of the 
Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (2008), we note that even Levinas who philosophised so much on the 
Other was also ethically anthropocentric (Calarco 32). In that way therefore, both Heidegger and Levinas 
reinforced the humanism inherent in classical philosophers and modern philosophers like Aristotle, 
Descartes and Kant. It was Adorno and Horkheimer who for the first time went beyond anthropocentric 
frames and later Judith Butler`s idea of “precarious life” also incorporated both human and animal life in 
her definition of precarity (Calarco 34). Radical philosophical theorisations promoted by Derrida, Deleuze 
and Hélène Cixous about whom we would come at a later stage in this paper convinced us that  
[…] rethinking our relationships with animals is one of the most pressing tasks of our age. 
(Calarco 35) 
 
“The questions concerning animals and animality represent the limit upon which all the great 
questions are formed and determined, as well as all the concepts that attempt to delimit what 
is ‘proper to man’” (Calarco 36)  
 
Animals are singular and our ethical response is determined not by our autonomous sense of subjectivity 
but through logic of heteronomy in which the encounter with the other determines our ethical response to 
the other. So seen in that light what ethical responsibility or response should we offer for the animal? The 
animal is more than what we think him/her to be. She is irreducible in her ontological essence and eludes 
our anthropomorphic and reductivist comprehensive grasp. 
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Derrida`s encounter with his cat which he enunciates in his The Animal that Therefore I Am makes 
him realize more about his own human persona. He reminds us that his cat precedes and exceeds his 
conceptual machination about her. Derrida says that he sees it 
As a place where it can encounter me, see me, even see me naked. Nothing can ever take 
away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be 
conceptualized. (Calarco 40) 
 
The animal, or as Derrida coined the neologism, the “animot” eludes our human comprehensive grasp and 
it requires us to scale down and get immersed in the self of the other to realize the other. Such a process 
once again requires us to unlearn and re-learn to think through animals, through our Earth-others. This 
can only be achieved through a radical transformation in thinking and in what follows we map the 
contours of such a new manifesto for living in the Anthropocene. Subsequently we would go to radical 
French poststructuralist theory to enunciate our support for new posthumanist trajectories. 
 
Manifesto for Living in the Anthropocene 
All the ideas discussed so far have been enforced and complemented in the recent work, Manifesto for 
Living in the Anthropocene, edited by Katherine Gibson, Deborah Bird Rose, and Ruth Fincher (2015). 
This book seeks to “Enliven moral imagination, drawing us into deeper understandings of responsibilities, 
reparative possibilities and alternative futures” (Gibson et al. ii). The prelude to the Manifesto starts off 
with reference to the Biosphere, the part of the air where the humans and non-human animals can survive 
along with the whole abiotic element of the natural world. This era of the Anthropocene requires the 
conjoining of the natural world with the cultural world of intellectual episteme and the section in the 
manifesto on “Thinking” is about transforming our preconceived conceptualizations of Renaissance 
Humanism. It is about listening to the world for a change that would engender the possibility of thinking 
“with” the world and not “for” it because those solutions that look at nature as a mere objective, dead 
entity would always look for economy-driven solutions and generate politico-philosophical measures. The 
“preface” to the manifesto by Katherine Gibson, Deborah Bird Rose and Ruth Fincher is about 
strengthening the “tentative connections” between Ecological Humanities and Community Economies (i). 
The insistence on a reparative study of anthropological climate change to promote an ecological-
economic thinking (vii), can be effective in repairing the peril that has been wrought upon the 
environment by humans. In short any theorization regarding the environment needs to be done outside the 
play of the binaries which has been a common trait of Renaissance Humanism.  
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The conceptualization in the manifesto on “Thinking with Others” (n. pag.) addresses various 
anthropogenic events and focuses on the intertwined link between human history and natural history 
negating in that way the division between man and nature. It focuses on the fact that the real enemy that 
should be combated is not global warming but our preconceived understandings of the world which is 
largely determined by Western Enlightenment thinking. Our anthropomorphic hubris promotes the idea of 
the self and the other due to which we are habituated to think about or for Nature rather than “with” it. 
Time has come for the Homo Faber and Homo economicus to evolve into the Homo reflectus who can 
dislodge all our materialist greed to inaugurate a thinking-self- for- the- other. It is high time to 
deconstruct the Cartesian ideology that renders the non-human other as meaningless and dead. Three 
strategies are visualized here to salvage humanity in the Anthropocene: “Rethinking Being” that suggests 
the abandonment of the concept of “being” and the appropriation of the apprehension of “being-in-
common,” “Assiduity of parochial consideration of economies,” usefulness of “bio-mimicry” and 
germaneness of practices of the “knowledge of bionomics” through “permaculture” designs are ways that 
can generate the existence of livelihood that can be shared across species; and the third is “Ethical 
Coordinates for More-Than Human Communities” which proposes the ways of conjoined livelihoods of 
humans and non-human others. The penultimate section of the manifesto called, “Contact Improvisation” 
suggests a form of dance positioned on the propinquity of the collaborators. The concept is to: 
 
Explore further the eco-philosophical implications of Contact Improvisation, by 
considering what it might mean to dance with the “earth body” that we have. “Earth 
body” might be taken to signify my own body, understood as a thing of Earth, as is that 
of all creatures, human and otherwise, with whom I share an earthly existence in the 
“dance” of life.  (Gibson et al., ch. 7, 44-45) 
 
The norm of perceiving the world as a dead object can be changed if we start listening to it. The 
abandoning of delusions of mastery and control would then cease and we would argue that such a 
paradigm shift in human thinking can only happen when we incorporate the revolutionary tropes of 
radical French poststructuralist thinking. In what follows we would elaborate on that. Before that, we 
would like to engage briefly with Dipesh Chakrabarty`s notion of “species history” which, we believe, 
can unleash the radical imaginaries of new thinking in an Anthropocentric world.  
Deep History and Species History 
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The present excursus now takes the two essays of Dipesh Chakrabarty published in Critical Inquiry, 
“Climate and Capital: On Conjoined Histories” (2014) and “The Climate of History: Four Theses” (2009) 
as its point of departure to argue for a new post-anthropocentric imaginary in the domain of critical 
theory. In doing this it draws largely on available templates of radical French thinking as enunciated by 
Giles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Hélène Cixous and Jean-Luc Nancy and also on recent theoretic 
trajectories of new disciplines such as Critical animal studies (Calarco 2008; 2015) and New Materialism 
(Crockett and Robbins 2012) etc. All these radical thought currents go beyond the Anthropocentric 
paradigm to unpack new road maps for future through innovative ideas of ethics, subjectivity, energy, 
theology and politics and any deliberation of post-Anthropocentrism must incorporate these radical optics 
to constitute a grammar of counter-epistemology of the future. In asserting our propositions further, we 
would begin by referring to Chakrabarty`s concern for a new model of “deep history.” We would 
however, argue that while Chakrabarty is right in drawing our collective attention to the anthropomorphic 
bias of all existing historiographic or political economic epistemes and also justified in his reiterated 
demand for inaugurating a new genre of planet history or species history to understand the implications of 
the Anthropocene, he fails to walk the extra mile to incorporate a genuine deconstructive approach to the 
problem. He goes near and yet shies away from the crux of the matter, and in that way misses the real 
implications of the whole task (Purakayastha, forthcoming). His whole endeavour in both his two essays 
seems to be only to project the inefficacy of our normative analytical modes of political economy. There 
is no denying that we need to recognize now the enormity of the planetary and geological changes, and 
yet we are powerless to ward off cosmic upheavals. All that we can do is to replace our existing political 
economic and sociological structures and habits which are accentuating geological changes. Chakrabarty 
seems to deny that. The Anthropocene, we have already demonstrated, necessitates a restructuring of our 
conventional imaginaries so far as our ideologies, consumption patterns and ontological orientations to 
others are concerned. In Chakrabarty we merely get the articulation of a genuine concern for the fallout of 
the Anthropocene but his over-prioritization of planet history over geo-political or political economic 
praxis can be seriously questioned on the ground of repetitiousness, closure and lack of futural directions 
(Purakayastha, forthcoming). His notion of species history or his proposition for an earth saving politics 
to avert the anthropogenic climate change is pertinent but not adequate enough to constitute a real 
paradigm shift in humanities and social sciences. For attaining that, we argue, we need to go to radical 
French thinking on post-subjective critical theory and also to the proponents of critical animal studies or 
zoomorphic zoontologies who have been raising these points on a requisite earth centric “geology of 
morals” or humanimality to dislodge the hegemony of the humanist logic that we have already discussed. 
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At the end of his paper, Chakrabarty speaks of “Enlightenment reason” as the savior that can salvage us 
from the apocalyptic doomsday arising out of global warming but radical French thinking and Critical 
Animal Study theorists have ascribed all anthropogenic aberrations to the instrumentality of 
Enlightenment reason and its associative logic of human sovereignty that resulted in the hubris of the 
human cogito and the annihilation of the other species and geological resources. Chakrabarty`s flaw can 
be compensated through the findings of French theory on the post-subject which in the next section we 
would engage with. 
Posthumanism, Becoming Animal and Derridean Khora 
Drawing primarily on recent works in these fields such as The Reject: Community, Politics and Religion 
after the Subject (Goh, 2015) and The Animal Question in Deconstruction (Turner, 2014); Religion 
Politics and the Earth: The New Materialism (Crockett & Robbins, 2012), etc this paper posits for a 
futural thinking of the Derridean khora, the “non-ground” that thinks beyond (auto-reject) our 
anthropocentric or anthropomorphic aspects, a project that incorporates non-human animals, their voices 
and silences. Irving Goh while enunciating his idea of the “auto-reject” spoke at length on Derrida`s idea 
of the Khora and he notes that: 
Khora, according to Derrida, will be that place where new thoughts or new ways of thinking 
(about religion) receive, in their instants of articulation or arrival, what Derrida calls 
“unconditional hospitality” …Derrida will state that Khora can never be defined, 
determined, or identified as this or that place. Khora rejects localizing itself: it rejects 
determining a place of or for itself. It is no place or a nonplace. It is almost an impossible 
place, yet always necessary to claim a proximity to it, or an approximation of it, in order to 
give voice or place to the new.  (Goh 130) 
 
 If the khora allows the “impossible possibility” of the arrival of the other, then we can think of the 
absolute alterity, or as Derrida called it, the “divinanimality” that “breaks with […] the similar, to situate 
oneself at least in a place of alterity radical enough whereby one must break with all identification with an 
image of oneself, … with all humanity.” (Goh 233)   In this context, Hélène Cixous’ notion of the 
“counter Bible” or the animal perspective or the “animots” appears highly relevant. The term “animot” 
has been translated as “animal words” and it is “a matter of following or chasing after the animal, of 
assuming an animal perspective.” (Goh 150-151) This transformation from the human subject to the 
animal point of view is a superb form of auto-rejection and marks the rejection of the human experience 
and it does not mourn the “death by human knowledge” (Goh 151) Borrowing from Cixous, Goh calls 
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such animotisation as our “second innocence” that animates divine jouissance because through it we 
abandon our sovereign human self and embrace a new innocence of nonhuman knowledge. Can we then 
think of a future discourse of politics/survival strategy in the Anthropocene centering on the non-human 
or the animal? We would argue for the Deleuzean idea of “becoming non-human,” or the “becoming 
animal” for radical survival possibilities in the Anthropocene. This impossible figure can be the animal, 
as the animal has always been rejected as a possible figure of thought in politics or political philosophy. 
“Becoming-animal” is that trajectory of resistance and to adopt the idea of becoming animal we need to 
“push existing political thought beyond its anthropologic and/or anthropocentric limits.” (Goh 202). The 
particular feeling or sensation of animal affects may perhaps be found in the originary and communicative 
aisthesis that humans and animals share. To cross the adjacent space of the animal is a question of 
recovering the originary aesthesis that is recovering the sensation of the earth milieu, of aisthesis that 
humans and animals originarily share. Originary aisthesis was lost when “Aristotle supplemented it with 
the anthropocentric logos in his political philosophy” (Goh 230). Aisthesis in its immediate sensing and 
communication of pain or wrong done to a human or animal/ecology is of political potentiality, that is 
aisthesis in itself is already adequate to demand an addressing of the wrong committed against a human or 
animal or the Earth. Aristotle however refused to recognize the political potential of aisthesis. To recover 
aesthesis, before it is supplemented by a form of logos that has been appropriated by and reduced to the 
human is not only a way toward the adjacent space of becoming animal, but is also an unveiling of 
becoming animal`s potentiality for a future political project of justice. This brings us to posthumanism, to 
ideas of anthropomorphic others or “earth others,” to “zoo-morphic” paradigms. “Critical 
anthropomorphism” looks into contemporary French thought`s idea of the “clinamen” which is clearly 
evident in the works of Michael Seres, Deleuze and Guattari and Nancy. “Clinamen” is some sort of 
subtractive thinking that debunks the capitalist accumulative impulse that drives the thought of the human 
subject, or subjectivity. In other words, the thought of the clinamen takes into account the fact that “one is 
always already in the process of auto-rejecting some part of oneself, even though this takes place at a 
molecular or atomic scale.” (Goh, 233) For a posthumanism that continues the poststructuralist 
deconstruction of the capitalist subject, clinamen can be its point of departure to a world of auto-
subtraction/rejection for multiple dissonances to exist. Dipesh Chakrabarty’s apocalyptic apprehensions, 
though completely justified could have been supplemented with such configurations of futural thoughts 
and his repeated harping on the inadequacy of capitalist history and the requisite primacy of species 
history would be taken up for a critical analysis in the subsequent section to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of his own futural openings.       
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N-1 Community or Becoming Animal/Divinanimality: What Comes after the Subject? 
The post-anthropocene phase of life demands new trajectories of thinking so far as the idea of self, 
community, ontology, politics and ethics are concerned, something that Chakrabarty hinted at but he 
remained within the same old humanist frame. Radical French poststructuralist thinkers on the other hand 
had thought about the absolutism of the humanistic frame long back and their quest for post-subjective or 
post-humanist ontologies are more than relevant now. In what follows we would dwell on radical French 
philosophical ideas of post-humanism as enunciated by Irving Goh in his The Reject: Community, Politics 
and Religion after the Subject (2015). In a certain way, the present day geo-political conditions, Goh 
observes, make us all rejects, either we reject others socially and politically, ontologically or we get 
rejected by others and that makes the category of the reject so important for us and Irving Goh’s book, 
The Reject (2015) as the title suggests, philosophizes on the theoretic category of the reject through the 
radical philosophic optics of contemporary French thoughts. Goh takes Jean Luc Nancy`s poststructuralist 
inquiry made in the sixties about “what comes after the subject” – a question that Nancy posed to his 
leading contemporaries such as Derrida, Deleuze, Alain Badiou and many others who grappled with the 
poststructural problematic of the liquidation of the “sovereign subject” and its radical consequences – as 
his point of departure. Goh critically engages with some of the rejoinders to Nancy`s question and while 
evaluating those answers offers his own idea of the reject or the “auto-reject” which Goh argues, perfectly 
subtends all the radical responses to Nancy`s question as provided by Derrida, Deleuze, Badiou, even by 
Nancy himself, or by Hélène Cixous and others who theorized the possibilities of post-subjective 
configurations.  
Goh argues that as poststructuralism is very much a story of the reject, it is worthwhile to 
enunciate this paradigm of the reject with French thoughts and in doing this it elucidates the 
“philosophical, ethical and political potentialities of the reject and their implications for the contemporary 
world.” (Goh xii). He therefore, places the reject as a “critical figure of thought” in the post-
Anthropocentric world of capitalo-democratic politics that promotes the ethos of subjective sovereignty 
and consequent totalisation of human power. Through his engagement with the varied responses to 
Nancy`s question, Goh probes to establish how many of them fall short of real post-subjective 
imaginaries and subsequently asserts his own notion of the reject which he claims has the contours of 
genuine post-subjective templates. Goh would contend that almost all radical French thinkers such as 
Derrida, Deleuze, Helen Cixous and others in their theorization actually bordered onto the reject or the 
notion of the “auto-reject” to envisage our thoughts beyond the sovereign subject. In Goh’s analysis 
however, it is Deleuze and Guattari and Nancy himself who should be credited the most for upholding the 
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idea of the reject in their conceptualization of radical post-humanist paradigms.  The term reject is “but a 
shorthand for a theory that seeks to articulate and affirm a figure of thought that would give expression to 
the multiplicity of heterogeneous rejects” – they are figures who break away from all normative 
configurations. Goh cites the “nomadic war machine” (Deleuze), the “clinamen” (Nancy), the idea of the 
“becoming animal” (Deleuze), “Zoo-morphic” (Braidotti), the “animot” (Cixous), the “divinanimality” 
(Derrida), “animal messiah” (Cixous) etc – as prefiguration of the reject.    Deleuze`s response to Nancy 
rallied for the construction of “new functions and discover new fields that make [the subject] useless or 
inadequate” and Derrida`s opinion was, one could free oneself from “the necessity to keep at all cost the 
word subject …” (Goh, 2). As Goh goes back to Nancy`s question and attempts an adequate answer, he 
claims that such an answer remains the unfinished task of contemporary French thought, and the radical 
figure of thought in French theory that “comes after the subject” can establish French theory`s relevance 
to the contemporary world. Here Goh refers to Cary Wolfe`s views in his “What is Posthumanism?” 
which reiterates that the future of posthumanism or posthuman discourse can “take a leaf from 
contemporary French thought’s question - who comes after the subject?” (4). 
There appears to be a marked rise or resurrection of the subject with the assertion of all 
anthropomorphic paradigms and other forms of sovereignty across the globe and therefore devising a new 
figure of thought other than the classical notion of the subject can emerge as a viable strategy. Critical 
trajectories in the domain of feminism and postcolonial studies have been instrumental in critiquing the 
absolutist subject and in its discussion on the coming form of religion in the postsecular world, on 
friendship, communities and love, this book promotes the idea of the “auto-reject” as that new form of 
future. By proposing the theory of the reject or the auto-reject as a possible replacement of the totalizing 
subject Irving Goh offers a theory of new ethics. Auto-rejection according to him  
involves creative regeneration, therefore, … not self-annihilation (Goh 7) 
 
“Giving up all that one has prepared and gathered for oneself, and giving up the position on 
which one has begun to ground or found oneself with all that one has gathered: that is what 
the subject is unable or reluctant to do. The auto-reject meanwhile detaches or frees itself 
from such gathering and (self-) positioning”. (Goh 8)  
 
The ethical force of the auto-reject derives from its erasure of its sovereignty and in that way it affirms the 
respect for the other.  
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“the auto-reject, unlike the subject, has no interest in accumulating for itself predicates that 
might contribute to its foundation; it has no interest in totalizing everything, including 
elements outside of itself, within its grasp and control…has no interest either in whatsoever 
foundation of itself …” (Goh 8)  
 
While elucidating on the notion of the reject, Goh argues that the idea of reject is not exclusively his 
conjuration, in fact the reject “has always subtended philosophy” (13), it was already with philosophy 
right at its beginning and is evident in both Plato and Socrates and it traverses philosophy even after them.  
The Post-Secular Animal-Other and Post-Anthropocentrism 
Derrida`s naming of ideas such as “messianicity without messianism”, or his notion of the “khora” also 
borders onto the auto-reject in religion. For Derrida 
khora can never be defined, determined, or identified as this or that place. Khora rejects 
locating itself … it is no place or nonplace, it is almost an impossible place, yet always 
necessary to claim proximity to it, or an approximation of it, in order to give voice or place 
to the new. (130) 
 
This impossible but necessary place takes on a clearer contour of a reject or the auto-reject. For a future 
thinking of ontology, one must reject any adherence to a particular institution or ground, one must own up 
the khora, the non-ground. If the khora allows the “impossible possibility” of the arrival of the other, then 
we can think of the animal-other, the absolute alterity, or as Derrida called it, the “divinanimality” that 
“breaks with […] the similar, to situate oneself at least in a place of alterity radical enough whereby one 
must break with all identification with an image of oneself, … with all humanity.” (Goh, 136) So the 
auto-reject for the postsecular must follow after the animal. It is “only then that the reject or auto-reject 
can open religion and/or the postsecular to a future where differences not only between anthropocentric 
and anthropomorphic religions and reason, but also between humans and animals, are affirmed and 
respected.” (138) Goh’s take on ‘Prolegomenon to Reject Politics’ marvelously deepens this idea of 
“becoming non-human”, or the “becoming animal” as explicated by Deleuze. Like Derrida, for Deleuze 
and Guattari too: 
There is a politics of becoming animal: To the inhumanness of the ‘diabolical powers` 
responds the sub human … of becoming animal: become beetle, become dog, become ape, 
head over heels and away, rather than lower one`s head and remain a bureaucrat… judge or 
be judged. (198) 
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According to Deleuze and Guattari, “we lack resistance to the present” and Goh would add, “Becoming-
animal is that trajectory of resistance, if not force of rejection that we need today”. (Goh, 202) In other 
words, becoming animal can resist or sidestep the force of the “state war machine” and hence lead us out 
of the impasse of contemporary radical political/ethical thought. To adopt the idea of becoming animal we 
need to “push existing political thought beyond its anthropologic and/or anthropocentric limits. (Goh 202-
203) 
However, becoming animal proceeds at the molecular dimension, and hence if there is a 
magnitude to becoming animal, it would be at a level of what Deleuze and Guattari would call an “n-1 
degree magnitude”. They do not fail to articulate the aesthetic dimension of the aisthesis of becoming 
animal and as they believe, “it is through writing” in the sense of literature such as Kafka`s writings or 
Melville`s Moby Dick, “that you become animal” (209). So art is the site for Deleuze and Guattari where 
they locate the emergence of becoming animal. Hence becoming animal`s transversal communication 
between heterogeneous populations opens a body to an unlimited relation with any number of living 
entities. The becoming animal allies with the anomic and this alliance with the anomic is how becoming 
animal challenges the state`s politics of (dis)friendship and builds a transversal politics of the future. This 
brings us to posthumanism, to ideas of anthropomorphic others or “earth others,” to a “zoo-morphic” 
paradigms. Posthumanism is akin to auto-rejection and in such auto-rejection, posthumanism must be 
willing to take the risk of allowing new forms of relations it seeks with the reject other to fall into a state 
of inoperativity. Here Goh employs Nancy`s idea of “inoperative community” that suggests a 
posthumanism to refrain from totalizing all the rejects within its discourse (Goh 233). For a 
posthumanism that continues the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject by articulating the reject, 
especially the reject that is not borrowed but draws from itself as an auto-reject, clinamen can be its point 
of departure to a world of auto-subtraction/rejection for multiple dissonances to exist. In the subsequent 
conclusive part, we would discuss on how novelties of thought in New Materialist thinking and Critical 
Animal Studies can also provide those necessary domains of epistemic experimentations. 
Conclusion: Towards New Materialism and Critical Animal Studies 
We would like to conclude with the findings of New Materialists (Crocket and Robbins) and the 
proponents of critical animal studies or posthumanist studies through a detour of the works of Matthew 
Calarco, Stefan Herbrechter and Crockett and Robbins. In their work Religion, Politics and the Earth: 
The New Materialism (2012), Crockett and Robbins define new materialism as a new discipline that 
Sanglap 3.1 (August 2016) 
Critiquing Humanism 
 
112 
 
Takes seriously the material and physical world in which we live. The New Materialism is a 
materialism based on energy transformation…For us what we need is a theology that 
genuinely takes account of the earth without lapsing into wishful thinking about what it 
means to live in harmony with nature or New Age platitudes about Gaia that produce a false 
spirituality. (Crockett & Robbins xvi) 
 
Having defined New Materialism, Crockett and Robbins embark on a wonderful explanation of New 
Materialist idea of theology, energy, being, politics and ethics. They propose for an ‘athermal idea of 
energy’ keeping in mind the disastrous reality of the Anthropocene and in doing that, unlike Chakrabarty, 
they launch a severe attack on capitalism and go ahead with a concrete blue print of new politics and 
ethics which would rally for the hunt for alternative modes of non-heat energy through the application of 
non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Theirs is a perfect example of cross-disciplinary initiative to stave off 
the dire consequences of the Anthropocene as they involve a physicist and a radical artist in writing their 
manifesto on art and energy in the post-Anthropocene. Needless to say such intense and subtle analysis of 
energy requires specialized knowledge on physics and energy science but credit goes to the New 
Materialists as they perfectly blend specialized knowhow with a clear proposition for alternative earth 
centric materialist modes of thinking vis a vis energy, politics and ethics: 
We work against philosophical idealism by taking the earth as subject rather than simply 
asserting   and upholding the vantage point of spirit. Into this Hegelian or quasi Hegelian 
space, we are also asserting orinserting a Deleuzian emphasis on the earth.  In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari ask “Who does the earth think it is?”  as they posit not a 
genealogy of morals a la Nietzsche  but  a  geology  of  morals  –  an  earth  based  science  
of right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil  that  not  only  inspires  but  also  helps  to  define our  
project  with  the  new  materialism …We posit  earth  as  subject … Earth becomes  itself  
by  thinking  through  its  own  materiality,  energy,  forces,  layered strata,  atmosphere,  
magnetosphere…this process is dynamic and entropic process but it relies  upon  a  
reconceptualisation  of thermodynamics  provided  in part by  Deleuze  in  Difference and 
Repetition …  we claim that energy is immanent Deleuzo-Hegelian spirit (or Spirit), and 
energy avoids the traditional dichotomy between spirit and matter, because everything is 
energy transformation … the  earth  is  the  solution  to  the  energy  crisis,  but  we  do  not 
know how to  think  like  the  earth,  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  call  the mechanosphere. 
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We need to deterritorialize our thinking to unlink it from preestablished ruts and prescribed 
territories … As such this book is an experiment in thinking. (xx-xxi)  
 
This is indeed radical thinking and the proposed drive for reterritorialization of our thoughts looks for a 
carbon free future, or desires to constitute life beyond the paradigm of Homo Crabonicus (96), something 
that the delusion of corporate capitalism has deeply entrenched in our minds about the unending supply of 
fossil fuel-induced energy in this planet. This hunt for the alternative also takes into account the non-
human other or the animals as they lead their life in consonance with the Earth. The deconstruction of the 
anthropogenic self will be complete if we pull us down the pedestal of human superiority, and critical 
animal studies by Matthew Calarco, Cary Wolfe and Paola Cavalieri can be powerful entry points here.  
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